Discrete Game Theory
This is a formalization of game theory fundamentals in Lean 4, without real numbers, probability, or fixed-point theorems. Nash equilibria are computed by a terminating descent algorithm on finite face lattices.
The key ideas:
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Games record ordinal preferences — which action is better, not by how much.
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The probabilistic simplex of strategies is replaced by a discrete version. A face of the simplex (nonempty subset of vertices) replaces probability distributions as the notion of mixed strategy.
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Instead of using expected utility, preferences between faces are defined conservatively: A dominates B only when every action in A beats every action in B against every consistent opponent play. This produces a partial preference order on mixed strategies for each player.
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Nash equilibrium existence follows from a terminating descent algorithm that starts considering the mixture of all actions and eliminates dominated actions.
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The algorithm is not only provably terminating but directly executable: a computable
findNashruns the descent and returns a concrete Nash profile on any finite game, ready for#eval.